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Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason, first published in French in 2013 and 
translated into English by Laurent Dubois in 2017, brings together different analyses 
of the interconnections between racial thinking, postcolonialism, financial capital, 
postmodernity, and the politics of representation in an attempt to open up new 
possibilities of redefining the notion of black consciousness. Through an insightful 
study of the semiotics of taxonomy and its centrality in the formation of racial thinking, 
the Cameroonian philosopher focuses on building up a body of study aimed at 
proving or undermining that black reason1 has often provided justification for racial 
domination. The concept of black reason works in parallel with Immanuel Kant’s 
notion of the antinomy of pure reason,2 which arises when it is possible to answer 
a question providing two valid but opposing arguments. When applied to racial 
identities, Mbembe notes, pure reason shifts into black reason, which responds 
to the contradictory dynamism that insists upon the degradation of black bodies, 
both constructing and representing them as social excess, and that simultaneously 
considers them necessary sources from which to obtain maximum financial gains. 
The examination of the contradictory locus where black individuals are caught works 
precisely towards the text’s central point, which discusses whether a relationship 
towards blackness other than that based on racial domination could ever exist, or 
whether, to the contrary, black identity can only be conceived in relation to whiteness 
and in terms of fear, monetization, and precarity.
Paying particular attention to the colonial order, but also drawing on the racial 
dynamics that substantiated the apartheid system in South Africa or slavery in the 
United States, the philosopher contends that race allowed for the classification 
of “human beings in distinct categories […] endowed with specific physical and 
mental properties” (57). These systems of institutionalized segregation, far from just 
establishing power through the control of death, bureaucracy, and law, anchored the 
sovereignty of whiteness with the support of various disciplines of social and natural 
sciences such as anthropology or biology. As a result, whiteness was perceived 
in terms of subjectivity, intellect, and consumerism. The scientific othering of 
blackness, in its turn, brought about the insertion of black individuals into a process 
of social death (78) that classified them as objects, bodies, and commodities at 
once. In the polarization of whiteness as humanity and blackness as social surplus, 
modern states have seen the possibility to exploit a new political economy of life 
that “goes hand in hand with the increasing power of the ideology of security aimed 
at calculating and minimizing the risk and turning protection into the currency of 
citizenship” (22). Taken to its limit, this economy allows liberal democratic regimes 
to set up a system of self-appointed vigilantism that surveils, targets, and eliminates
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racialized individuals for the betterment of the community. A further analysis of 
this situation reveals that the problem is not as much the systematization of racial 
profiling as it is the assumption that racial reasoning —discrimination as a result 
of skin color— has superseded moral reasoning —discrimination as a result of a 
lack of ethical principles—. Simply put, one of the work’s central criticisms is that 
contemporary society has allowed and normalized the fact that a person’s right to 
life can be waived when skin color comes into play. 
It is in his approach to the politics of death and its imbrication with racial reasoning 
that Mbembe comes to terms with other modern thinkers such as Foucault, Nancy, 
Tocqueville, Boulaga, or Fanon. Drawing on different approaches to biopolitics, 
the philosopher notes that racism consists in “substituting what is with something 
else, with another reality” (32). Such reasoning echoes Foucault’s argument in that 
it suggests that racism both attests to, and feeds back from, the perception that 
certain individuals are considered threats insofar they do not fit within the patterns 
of racial normativity. Contrary to Foucault, who was invested in carrying out an 
epistemological study of the logic of races and racism from a privileged position, 
the author struggles to encompass in his work the standpoint of the colonized, 
of the fatal results of history.3 Nonetheless, he soon reaches the conclusion that 
regardless the point of view from which blackness is studied, death is always the 
center of gravity around which black bodies orbit. If they are objects of discourses, 
they are subjects of death (136). 
Following a line of inquiry initiated in his previous works,4 the references to death 
ultimately allow him to draw on one of the most central arguments of his work, which 
also brings in the text’s final conclusion: nocturnal power, the power to kill arising 
from a pact with the dead, or the power to die a death one desires is understood 
as a means to find empowerment from within oppression (135). As he notes, “the 
question of the pact with the dead, of the appropriation of a dead person […] is, to 
a large extent, the question at the heart of history, of slavery, race, and capitalism. 
[…] Racial capitalism is the equivalent of a giant necropolis” (136-137). Stripped of 
metaphors, nocturnal power can be read as a reformulation of Martin Heidegger’s 
assumption that it is only in the anticipation of death that one can experience life to 
the fullest. Nocturnal power responds, in this manner, to the capacity to etch on the 
deaths died by black ancestors, to keep their memories present, and to act on the 
appropriation of their suffering. It refers to the purest power possessed and wielded 
by black bodies –that which controls death, and which visibilizes and honors the 
struggles of destroyed generations.
The approach to nocturnal power foretells the answer to the central concern 
structuring Critique of Black Reason. For Mbembe, there is no blackness as such 
outside the “dialectic of possession, belonging, capitalism, and dynamiting”, neither 
in life nor death, for now (153). This assertion is not as despairing as it seems at 
first, for he later suggests, employing a rhetoric that verges on idealism, that “until 
we have eliminated racism from our current lives and imaginations, we will have 
to continue to struggle for the creation of a world-beyond-race” (177). Furthering 
NOTES
3 |  Emphasis 
mine.











































         452ºF  #20
Eva Puyuelo Ureña - ADHUC, Universitat de Barcelona
Critique of Black Reason
the tradition initiated by Alexis de Tocqueville and Fabien Eubossi Boulaga, who 
already contended the impossibility to reach racial equality and the need to seek 
empowerment through racial consciousness (94), the philosopher is in fact calling 
for a world without racism, yet for a world that still maintains a critical view of 
race. In other words, he is hinting at the possibility of transcending racial profiling 
maintaining —and celebrating— racial differences.
Taking everything into consideration, Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason 
is an outstanding study of the way in which the political and economic realities of 
colonialism, slavery, and other situations operating through racial domination have 
come to form black consciousness. The philosopher rereads the changes in racial 
power through a conscientious examination of the politics of liberal democratic 
regimes, the performativity of semiotics, and the deep-rootedness of natural 
sciences. This critical approach works towards a reformulation of the notion of 
power, which, in its condition of being “acquired and conserved owing to its capacity 
to create changing relations” (131), is slowly being conferred to black subjects, 
who have until now been “stuck at the foot of a wall with no doors, thinking that 
nonetheless everything will open up at the end. The black person knocks, begs, 
knocks again, waiting for someone to open a door that does not exist” (152). Critique 
of Black Reason spotlights the possibilities of pulling down the wall from within, of 
understanding and acting on history, and of assuming that black consciousness 
will never exist outside the limits of racial normativity. Racism might end, yet, he 
contends, races will always exist, transforming survival into a matter of finding the 
power of self-definition in, and through, differences, for, echoing James Baldwin’s 
bywords, “the weight of history will be there. We must learn to do a better job of 
carrying it, and sharing its burden” (177).
